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Abstract 
In our article we will first briefly review developments within critical psychology in Norway in the years after 
we prepared a review for Annual Review of Critical Psychology (in 2006). The substantial part of the article, 
however, will be an analysis and critical discussion of social psychology based on the assumption that social 
psychology (and the other social sciences) has a moral obligation to contribute in resolving pressing problems of 
our time; problems representing real threats to mankind and life on our planet (such as pollution and climate 
change, terrorism, poverty and unjust distribution of goods in an era of globalization, etc). These pressing 
problems of our time are somehow related to or even anchored in the currently globalizing ideology of 
neoliberalism. Our conclusion on this analysis will be that this assumption demands a social psychology rather 
different from the currently predominant experimental and laboratory based social psychology which 
individualizes the social. In particular, social psychology has to take the concept of ideology – a concept which 
is currently ignored or even excluded in mainstream social psychology - into consideration if social psychology 
is going to contribute to resolve challenging problems of our time (as they all carry ideological implications).  
 
keywords: individualized social psychology, societal social psychology,  globalization, neoliberalism, 
ideology  
 
 
 
Introduction
1
 
 
Neither as an academic nor as an applied field of study does social psychology address the 
societal nature of human beings. In fact mainstream social psychology currently ignores or 
neglects the societal level. Mainstream social psychology focuses almost only on individual 
and group levels at the cost of community and societal dimensions. But individuality and 
subjectivity cannot be understood and explained apart from social contexts. We are beings 
embedded in social, historical, economic and political contexts. We are citizens in society 
with rights and duties. We are part of transcultural and interregional networks of interaction. 
This is today’s social life which social psychology cannot ignore. Thus, social psychology 
needs concepts and theories which are anchored both in the psychological individual and at 
the societal level to capture the mutual interrelationships between them. 
 
In this article we will – as critical psychology has done before – promote a “societal social 
psychology” as opposed to the predominant “individualized social psychology”. In this 
endeavor we insist on the relevance of the concept of ideology. As critical psychologists 
before us have argued and shown, to capture that society and global social networks and 
                                                            
1 We are grateful to Norman Anderssen and Michael Billig for valuable comments on an earlier version of this 
article. 
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agencies which are our lives, the concept of ideology or ideological field is a necessary 
concept. This article starts by briefly analyzing the situation within today’s mainstream social 
psychology, concluding that a societal perspective is still surprisingly absent and should be 
revitalized. We contend that in this rearticulation of a societal approach the concept of 
ideology is particularly relevant. We will further demonstrate how analyses of language usage 
and shifts and changes in language usage over time can represent a particularly useful 
methodology when empirically studying ideologies and ideological shifts.
2
 Examples from 
such empirical analyzes will also be presented. Finally, we will briefly update our review 
from 2006 of the situation for critical psychology in Norway presented in the special issue 
“Critical psychology in a changing world” of ARCP 2006.  
 
Mainstream social psychology and the ignorance of society
3
 
 
Shaped in North America in the post-WWII period, in a predominantly positivistic 
atmosphere, modern social psychology was rendered into a largely experimental discipline 
(Jones, 1985). Within this context of time and place, mainstream social psychology developed 
into an individual psychological, as opposed to a sociological, form of social psychology 
(Farr, 1996). Mainstream social psychology has been, and still is, characterized primarily by 
studying the interaction between the individual and the social through experimental studies in 
the laboratory. As a consequence, societal and cultural levels have continually been 
underrepresented in mainstream social psychology: A situation forcefully pointed out by the 
social psychologist Doise (1982) in his book L’explication en psychologie sociale.4 The 
developmental psychologist Bronfenbrenner (1979) in his book The ecology of human 
development argued that societal and cultural levels involved in complex social systems are 
difficult, if not impossible, to capture in laboratory settings by experimental studies. The 
programmatic title of Himmelweit & Gaskell’s edited volume in 1990, Societal Psychology, 
envisaged an alternative. However, mainstream social psychology has remained 
individualized. 
 
This indifference towards society and culture is a paradox, as the roots of a genuinely societal, 
intersubjective and cultural social psychology lie within the history of the discipline itself 
(Farr, 1996). For example, the symbolic interactionists (Cooley, 1902/1964; Mead, 1934) 
contended that individual and society are “two sides of the same coin”; Vygotsky (1978) 
analyzed how social values, expectations and beliefs are internalized in the individual; and 
Lewin (1935) developed a model of the interaction between individual and environment. 
Thus, ecological, constructionist, critical and political social psychology (Bronfenbrenner, 
1979; Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; Gergen, 1973; Ibanez & Iniguez, 1997; Montero, 1997; 
Parker, 1999; Renshon & Duckitt, 2000), has for a long time strongly acknowledged the 
impact of society and culture: Humans at the same time produce and are themselves shaped 
by society. However, still three decades after Doise’s (1982) thorough analysis of levels of 
explanation and Gergen’s (1973) and Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) seminal critiques of 
experimentalism within social and developmental psychology, the societal level is strikingly 
                                                            
2 The present article can be read as an explication and systematization of some of the theoretical foundations 
underpinning the Oslo Ideology Project that we initiated and have been working on for more than a decade (see 
e.g., Nafstad, 2002, 2005; Nafstad, Carlquist, Aasen, Blakar, 2006; Nafstad, Blakar, Carlquist, Phelps & 
Rand-Hendriksen, 2007, 2009a; Nafstad, Blakar, Botchway & Rand-Hendriksen, 2009b). 
3As the following sections on ideology is based on and summarizes theoretical-empirical work conducted within 
the Oslo Ideology Project during the past decade, it is inevitable that theoretical-methodological issues have been 
presented and/or discussed in previous reports and publications from the project. 
4 English translation in 1986 as Levels of explanation in social psychology. 
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absent in mainstream social psychology. The marginalization of societal and cultural 
dimensions in mainstream social psychology is due to both conceptual and methodological 
reasons as the task of incorporating cultural and societal dimensions into social psychology is 
not merely a conceptual, but also a methodological challenge (Nafstad, Carlquist & Blakar, in 
press). The lack of applicable methods or tools of analysis for grasping relevant aspects of 
society might therefore be a major reason why research in social psychology still far too often 
excludes the societal or macro level in empirical research. As we see it, however, the main 
reason for this ignorance is, as Gergen (1973, 1989) pointed out, that mainstream psychology 
has strong resistance to acknowledge that psychology can be neither value free nor neutral. As 
researchers we are part of society and explicitly or implicitly take for granted assumptions of 
social life in our research. The philosopher of science Mendelsohn (1977. P. 3-4) therefore 
described scientific knowledge as social knowledge: “Science is an activity of human beings 
acting and interacting, thus a social activity. Its knowledge, its statements, its techniques have 
been created by human beings and developed, nurtured and shared among groups of human 
beings. Scientific knowledge is therefore fundamentally social knowledge. As a social 
activity, science is clearly a product of a history and of processes which occurred in time and 
in place and involved human actors. These actors had lives not only in science, but in the 
wider societies of which they were members.” Already in 1936 Mannheim pointed out that 
the act of knowing is dependent on the constitution of the vital being and the character of his 
or her living space, particularly the position and place of the thinking individual. The idea that 
each culture creates at all times its own truth about what society and human nature contains 
has never been a prioritized idea within mainstream social psychology. Mainstream social 
psychology with its predominant universal conception of the human being still strongly 
ignores, in fact obscures that our ideas both as researchers and ordinary human beings are 
heavily conditioned by our time and place. Foucault (1972, 1980) also pointed out that in 
different periods of time science develops what he termed “regimes of truth” about human 
nature. Our scientific knowledge is thus social activity developing from historical and cultural 
ideologies or systems of beliefs and values. Knowledge about the ideological situation, of 
predominant as well as counter ideologies in society, is therefore knowledge social 
psychology cannot afford to leave “outside the door”, to use William James’ (1909/1979, p. 
19) famous phrase.  
 
A societal social psychology 
 
Billig (1997: 51) argues: “If social psychologists take the project of investigating ideology 
seriously, the nature of social psychology will be dramatically transformed. Not merely will such a 
social psychology have very different methodological procedures, but more importantly, its 
intellectual scope will be expanded. By incorporating historical, anthropological, and linguistic 
insights, this social psychology will draw closer to other social scientific investigations. In so 
doing, it will be addressing some of the most important issues in the contemporary social 
sciences.” Moreover, Doise (1986, p. 15) contends: “Every society develops its own ideologies, its 
own systems of beliefs and representations, values and norms, which validate and maintain the 
established social order.” Applying the ideology concept might therefore help to transcend the 
nature of individualized social psychology thereby overcoming current limitations in the relevance 
of the discipline. 
 
The concept of ideology is commonly encountered and used in social philosophy and the other 
social sciences, such as sociology and anthropology (Eagleton, 1991). The ideology concept came 
into usage in science around 1800 to describe the work of a group of French philosophers who 
were exploring the science of ideas (Wilson, 1992). Within Marxism, the concept has a long 
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history regarding the analysis of how society and its structures are established and sustained 
(Adorno, 1967; Mannheim, 1936; Marx & Engels, 1932/1976). The ideology concept has 
furthermore proved useful in analysis of more specifically delineated social relations, such as 
power/powerlessness (Marx & Engels, 1932/1976) and how people or groups in power impose 
certain views of the world (Weltanschauung). These worldviews serve as veils, preventing other 
people from understanding that they are being oppressed and marginalized (Adorno, 1967; Billig, 
1991; Montero, 1994; Prilleltensky, 1994).  
 
The concept of ideology is thus characterized by a long and complex history and 
various contemporary interpretations in other social disciplines, but as pointed out, not in 
social psychology (cf. Thompson, 1990; McLellan, 1995). Analytically, the notion of 
ideology is best approached as a generic concept, with multiple potential meanings. By 
applying a wide understanding of the concept, one can understand ideologies as more or less 
coherent systems of ideas and beliefs concerning the world and social practices; the concept 
captures and describes how society socializes into their members’ preferred or normative 
views of social life and human nature (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This social field of 
ideologies becomes our frames of reference and shape and form our thinking and thereby 
social systems, social practices and ideas of how society at large has to function. Continually 
we develop, form and shape our social imaginaries, ideals and meaning systems about life, 
and also incorporate them as individual truths of social life and human nature. We thus create 
our ideological fields at the same time as these ideological fields recast us. However, modern 
mainstream social psychology has to a large degree ignored these interdependencies between 
the indidividual and the societal system. In fact, mainstream social psychology, as mentioned, 
very often treats micro level phenomena as universal and natural phenomena. As a 
consequence, a huge part of mainstream social psychology has made itself somewhat 
irrelevant in understanding ordinary people’s lives. The discipline has in fact adopted an 
epistemology which does not open up for the relationships between the societal, historical, 
economic and political contexts and the individual level; how we as humans create our social 
contexts, our ideas and beliefs concerning the world and then incorporate our ideological 
fields as almost universal, individual phenomena. In our own research we are continually 
studying these social and discursive constructions and their individual consequences, 
questioning for example the price we are paying at the macro and the individual level for 
today’s globalizing strong individualistic ideology (Nafstad et al., 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Do 
we at the individual level “pay for it” with the consequence of less feelings of communality, 
connectedness and less social responsibility and willingness to stand up for others? Do we at 
the societal level “pay for it” by erosion of the ideals and practices of equal (and free) access 
to health, education and other welfare provisions in a traditional welfare society such as 
Norway? As we see it, these questions have to be approached with an understanding of how 
the ideology field functions as normative and self-evident.  
 
The wide conception of ideology historically encompasses two theoretical traditions: 
First, the political traditions with roots in Marxism, and second, the “belief systems” or 
“common sense” approaches to ideology (cf. Eagleton, 1991; Billig, 1991; van Dijk, 1998; 
Montenegro, 2002 for discussions of these traditions). Common to both traditions is, as 
described, that ideology operates largely outside awareness, as taken-for-granted 
representations of social life; as truths about social justice, power relations and distribution of 
goods. Ideologies have profound influence precisely because they tend to be taken for 
granted, without further reflection, by members of society. This process of encoding is closely 
connected to what Ichheiser (1970, p.15) describes as “implicit, silently operating 
mechanisms shaping and misshaping our social perception”. Under the force of ideology, 
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human beings are at the risk of being “blind to the obvious” (Ichheiser, 1970, p. 7). Social 
psychological research can thus apply this analytical concept to expose and critically unmask 
that which is taken for granted. Moreover, a key psychological function of ideologies is not 
only to produce ideas and to explain, but also to justify the status quo, and possibly consign 
oppositional voices to silence. In this respect, ideology serves as society’s system justification 
(Jost, Burgess & Mosso, 2001; Montenegro, 2002; Prilleltensky, 1994). 
 
An importunate issue for critical psychology then is why mainstream social psychology 
with the exception of community social psychology so entirely has eschewed the ideology 
concept
5
; definitely an essential social psychological reality. We contend, as mentioned, that the 
efforts of psychology to gain acceptance as a neutral and descriptive natural science, as well as 
today’s increasing focus primarily on biological perspectives, are important reasons why the 
concept of ideology is not considered sufficiently “scientific”. Mainstream social psychology has 
therefore in practice excluded from its research agenda socio-ecological, historical and political 
contextual analyses, thereby as a consequence ignoring societal issues such as social injustice, 
social inequality, globalization, corporate and consumer culture, and the influence of strong 
commercialism on ordinary people’s lives around the world. Moreover, this ignorance has in turn 
resulted in researchers and practitioners of psychology often being unreflective about their role as 
ideology producers for society (Billig, 1997; Gergen, 1973; Montero, 2005; Nafstad, 2005, 2008; 
Prilleltensky, 1994). Another reason why social psychology leaves out the concept ideology is the 
lack of methods for assessing ideologies. This last issue will be addressed as we continue to 
expose the concept of ideology, but now using our own ideology research as illustrative examples 
(see below).  
 
Ideology, hegemony and power 
 
Our use of the term ideology firstly includes society’s dominating ideas and beliefs. A key 
function of ideology, however, is not only to explain, but as mentioned also to legitimize the status 
quo. Our own theoretical and empirical approach also includes those thoughts and beliefs that are 
sufficiently powerful to challenge the status quo of society. Such ideologies can be referred to as 
counter ideologies (Nafstad et al., 2009a). In line with Thompson (1990), we thus suggest that 
ideology and ideological transmission refers specifically to the ways in which meaning serves to 
establish and maintain structures of power (Nafstad et al., 2007). Furthermore, one of the 
definitional dilemmas of the concept of ideology is whether the notion of ideology refers to any 
set of beliefs, or only the dominant forms of thought in society (Eagleton, 1991). Drawing on 
Gramsci (1971) we distinguish between the two interrelated aspects of ideology in our empirical 
research: First, ideology as common sense of society (Billig, 1997), which consists of shared 
ideas, although not necessarily coherent. From this perspective, ideology refers to: “... the ideas 
and thoughts that people hold, including both the form and content of their consciousness” 
(Sampson, 1981, p. 731). Thus we in our research understand ideology as an “economizing device 
that incorporates a world view that legitimizes the existing order and provides a framework for a 
consensus of the general purposes of community life” (Wilson, 1992, p. 19). The second aspect is 
hegemony, or rule by consent or accepted authority. The ideology concept thus for us refers to the 
perceived legitimacy and often widespread support that a certain system, currently for example 
consumerism, receives from the public (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue, 2006; Schwartz, 
                                                            
5 To the extent that main stream (social) psychology has used the concept of ideology, ideology has in the 
tradition of individualism been conceived of as a personality characteristic. Classical examples are ”The 
authoritarian personality” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1960) and ”The open and closed 
mind:investigations into the nature of belief systems and personality systems.” (Rokeach, 1960). 
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2000). Hegemony involves then the incorporation of subordinate groups into the dominant 
ideology, often facilitated by construction of alliances, and thus winning approval of these groups 
(Fairclough, 1992). Both the common sense and hegemony aspects imply that ideology to a large 
extent becomes naturalized. In our empirical studies we contend that ideologies are encoded and 
naturalized in implicit premises and structural features of language (Rommetveit, 1968; 
Rommetveit & Blakar, 1979). 
 
Ideologies are reflected in language usage 
 
Linguists, social scientists, and some psychologists have for quite some time acknowledged the 
close and reciprocal relations between language and ideology. Anthropological traditions 
analyzing the interaction of language and ideology have evolved (for reviews, see Kroskrity, 2000; 
Woolard, 1998). In our research we take these close relationships between ideology and language 
as our point of departure. Within the multi-disciplinary field of discourse analysis, language usage 
is often studied in relation to ideology (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Fairclough, 1992; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; van Dijk, 1998). Silverstein (1985, p. 220) emphasizes the reciprocal interaction 
between language and ideology: “… the total linguistic fact, the datum for a science of language, 
is irreducibly dialectic in nature. It is an unstable mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms 
contextualized to situations of interested human use and mediated by the fact of cultural 
ideology.” Adopting a more psychological perspective, Jovchelovitch (2006) shows how the 
relationship between macro-social structures such as ideology or culture on one hand, and 
linguistic practice and the singular word on the other, is constituted by everyday knowledge. Such 
knowledge exits in the form of social representations which, although individually held, are shared 
between members of a group or society. It is this contextualization and mediation through cultural 
ideology which renders language, indeed even the single word (Blakar, 1979; Pennebaker et al., 
2003; Rommetveit, 1968; Rommetveit & Blakar, 1979), into an empirical reflection of the society 
at hand, and its potential influence on the individual. Our empirical studies of ideology and 
ideological changes (see below) are based on these linguistic reflections and conceptions of 
society. 
 
The Russian linguist and philosopher Bakhtin (1952/1986) argued that social psychology is 
localized in the word, the gesture and the act. In the same way as Wittgenstein (1953) 
demonstrated how we obtain knowledge about humans and society by studying language in use, 
introducing the analytical concept “language games”, Bakthin (1952/1986) emphasized how we 
obtain knowledge about society by studying various “speech genres”. Furthermore, through 
concepts such as “symbolic domination” and models of “linguistic markets”, the French social 
philosophers, in particular Bourdieu (1991) and Foucault (1980), noted the close and mutual 
interplay between societal ideologies and power relations on one hand, and linguistic means on the 
other. In summary, words reveal important aspects of the societal level (Rommetveit, 1968). As 
Sarason (1981: 47) argued: “… the world view is always expressed in our language …” Societal 
ideologies are reflected in the usage of even the most ordinary and trivial words and utterances, 
and can determine our understanding of the social world (Blakar, 1979). Changes in language 
usage over time therefore reflect macro-social or ideological developments within society (Blakar, 
1979). To analyze societal and cultural impacts on the individual, relational and group levels, 
ordinary words and expressions constitute, as we see it, useful analytical units. Words are not 
neutral in representing and grasping the social and material world. Words reflect particular 
perspectives, thereby expressing some interests at the cost of others (Blakar, 1979). Therefore, 
words in general and change in usage of words in particular can serve as empirical indicators of 
ideological change. At the same time they are the instruments by which individuals make sense of 
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the world. Words and language usage thus constitute a subject matter where the societal and the 
individual levels meet and merge.  
 
A lack of adequate methodology for studying ideology may, as mentioned, in part explain why 
ideology has been neglected within mainstream social psychology. For the social sciences and 
psychology, surveys involving questionnaires, interviews and different types of attitude scales are 
usual procedures for mapping out cultural assumptions, values, and occasionally ideologies. Such 
methods involve several weaknesses when applied to assess ideologies. First, they presume that 
ideologies can be explored by only asking individuals. In our opinion, such methods often are 
unable to reveal in particular the mechanisms by which power relations within culture and society 
are internalized by the individual and naturalized as common sense. Secondly, longitudinal 
analyses are of utmost importance when studying ideological change. However, within survey 
research, longitudinal analyses are time-consuming and difficult to administer. Whereas archive 
methodology can easily be used retrospectively in longitudinal research, survey methodology can 
merely be used here-and-now, or at best prospectively, which implies that one will have to 
anticipate years in advance which particular issues will be ideologically at stake some time in the 
future. Because ideologies and ideological changes are reflected in language usage, ideologies are 
thereby made amendable to systematic empirical investigation. 
 
Archive methodology: The Oslo Ideology Project 
 
People make sense of their world through everyday conversation, and today increasingly through 
the media (Perse, 2001). Therefore, media discourse and public language are important keys to 
understand how ideology is communicated and reproduced among individuals in society 
(Thompson, 1990). Or as Billig (1997, p. 48) concludes: “When individuals speak (and write – 
added here) they do not create their own language, they use terms which are culturally, historically 
and ideologically available. Each act of utterance, although in itself novel carries an ideological 
history.” In our research we are analyzing media language. Until recently, empirical analyses of 
huge databases of text (e.g., several annual volumes of newspapers) have been time consuming 
and costly. However, modern information technology has changed the situation. Huge 
electronically searchable databases covering, e.g., newspapers across decades are now available in 
many countries. In Norway, where the present authors are situated, an electronically searchable 
database covering several newspapers and other types of publications has been available since 
1984.
6
 Electronically searchable archives of media language constitute, as we see it, a relevant and 
unobtrusive (non-researcher influenced) method for assessing ideological fields and 
transformations of ideologies in society
7
. 
 
We will now present a few illustrative findings from studies we have conducted within the Oslo 
Ideology Project adopting electronically searchable archives of media language
8
. One of the major 
quantitative indicators we use in our studies is the number of articles in each annual volume of 
newspapers containing a particular word or phrase. This indicator enables us to “read” ideological 
changes in society from year to year. For example, a markedly increasing consumerism has been 
identified, reflected e.g., in a marked increase in usage of words related to shopping such as 
                                                            
6 In many countries older annual volumes of newspapers are scanned in, enabling searches within particular 
newspapers across several decades. 
7 Our methodology was originally inspired by corpus linguistics (Nafstad & Blakar, 2002/2006). Moreover, our 
methodology carries certain similarities to the way in which corpus linguistics is now gradually being used 
within critical discourse analysis (cf. Mautner, 2009). 
8 Interested readers are referred to the following recent publications for detailed presentations of this 
methodology: Nafstad et al., 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Rand-Hendriksen, 2008. 
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‘kjøpe’ (to buy) and ‘shoppe’ (to shop) as well as introduction of new words such as ‘kjøpefest’ 
(feast of buying) (Nafstad et al., 2009a). Moreover, we have demonstrated how the Norwegian 
society over the past decades has become increasingly imbued by market ideology (Nafstad et al., 
2009a). This is reflected by the introduction in the newspapers of new words such as 
‘konkurranseutsetting’ (exposure to competition) in relation to social and health institutions 
traditionally driven by the state or municipality, such as homes for elderly, and marked reduction 
in usage of words such as ‘solidaritet’ (solidarity), ‘felles’ (common, communal, shared) and 
‘velferdssamfunn’ (welfare society) (Nafstad & Blakar, 2009; Nafstad, et al., 2006). However, 
counter ideologies are also identified, often reflected in newly introduced words and expressions 
such as ‘bestemor på anbud’ (the tendered grandmother) as an ideological reaction to homes for 
elderly being exposed to competition and ‘kjøpepress’ (press to buy) as an ideological reaction to 
the currently predominant consumerism (Nafstad et al., 2009a). Moreover, changes in the societal 
contract between individual and society/community and the subtle balance between rights and 
duties are being identified: The usage of ‘rettighet’ (rights) has increased whereas usage of ‘plikt’ 
(duty) and ‘ansvar’ (responsibility) has decreased (Nafstad et al., 2007). 
 
This archive methodology can be adopted in comparative studies as well as in longitudinal 
analyses within one society. A methodological challenge encountered in comparative studies is 
that available search technologies are not equally designed or developed in all societies.
9
 We have, 
for example, compared how the currently globalizing neoliberalism merges with local ideologies 
so that strikingly different ideological patterns result in Norway, a North European country 
compared with Ghana, a West African country: Whereas individualism increases in both societies 
in our era of strong, globalized neoliberalism (usage of words such as “I” , “me” and “rights” 
increases) and communal or collective values decrease in Norway (usage of words such as “we”, 
“us” and “solidarity” decreases), communal or collective values increase in Ghana (increase even 
more than the usage of words referring to individualism) (Nafstad et al., 2009b). By this 
methodology we have also examined changing patterns of words with social, moral and political 
implications and consequences or ideological representations across time of sexual minorities 
(Roen, Blakar & Nafstad, 2011) as well as of various immigrant minorities (Phelps, Blakar, 
Carlquist, Nafstad & Rand-Hendriksen, submitted).  
 
In affluent democracies hegemony does not imply only one discourse, perspective or meaning 
system on social institutions, social practices and social life. Continually, there exist predominant 
ideologies as well as minority voices or counter ideologies competing for dominance and framing 
influence (van Dijk, 1998; Nafstad et al., 2007). Yet, there are some ideological discourses that are 
more predominant than others. In our research within the Oslo Ideology Project we have, as 
briefly presented, demonstrated how the globalizing ideology of neoliberalism currently 
constitutes a highly predominant and strong discourse. Not only Norwegians, but increasingly 
more people all over the world are shaped by, and reproduce, this world view (Nafstad, 2002; 
Nafstad et al., 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Today’s predominant neoliberalist market ideology may have 
positive effects for some sectors such as technology and economic interdependence. However, in 
our own research we critically argue that public discourses heavily prioritizing the values of 
materialism, consumerism, individualism and competition, gradually will dehumanize society, 
communities and individual humanity; reduce us to only social and material consumption beings 
without sense of community, justice and social responsibility. This ideological situation as a 
consequence affects the social contracts between individual and “local” community in ways that 
                                                            
9 Within the Oslo Ideology Project we have so far investigated ideologies and ideological changes within the 
following countries: China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, 
Turkey and US. 
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can in fact radically change and disrupt social, collective or common arrangements and ‘safety 
nets’ such as labor unions and welfare provisions within a community. In particular, the ideal of 
social and economic equality to all members of society may be a value increasingly ignored in the 
Norwegian society.  
 
As we see it, one task for critical national psychologies today is continually to expose and unmask 
the consequences of being embedded in contexts of strong corporate consumerism globalization. 
This endeavor, however, will not be easy. For as Bourdieu (1998, p.29) more than a decade ago 
pointed out: “Everywhere we hear it said, all day long – and this is what gives the dominant 
discourse its strength – that there is nothing to put forward in opposition to the neoliberal view, 
that it has succeeded in presenting itself as self-evident, that there is no alternative.” One major 
task for critical psychology, for example in Norway, then is to enhance our awareness that today’s 
strong neoliberalism is something made and remade by ourselves, rather than an impersonal 
machine we have to surrender. Before this article is closed, we will therefore now briefly analyze 
the current situation of critical psychology in Norway. 
 
Critical psychology in Norway: A brief update 
 
Of all the different psychological sub-disciplines, community psychology is likely to be the one 
most strongly associated with critical psychology. In their recent review of Norwegian community 
psychology, however, Carlquist, Blakar & Nafstad (2007) concluded that by a stringent definition 
of community psychology (CP) work, no or little community psychology is being undertaken in 
Norway. This general conclusion was elaborated and modified in ways that points to the absence 
of critical psychology: “… many Norwegian psychologists across a wide scope of fields integrate 
and adopt CP principles in their work. Yet, the critical and political nature of CP has been absent” 
(Carlquist et al., 2007, p. 282. Italics added.). This situation is here explained on the basis of the 
socio-cultural and political conditions in Norway. And Carlquist et al. (2007, p.282) continue: 
“The ideals of social justice and security, empowerment and community participation have been 
cornerstones in the development of the Norwegian welfare state. CP-oriented psychologists in 
Norway have more or less tacitly taken for granted that they are part of a larger system or process 
– the welfare society - characterized by fairness and social justice.” (Italics added). Under these 
conditions the plea for critical psychology has in general not been very strong
10
. 
 
As underlined, during the past decades the neoliberalist ideology has increasingly dominated 
all over the (Western) world and has also become strongly influential within the traditional 
Norwegian welfare state (Carlquist et al., 2007; Nafstad et al., 2007, 2009a). This ideology 
does not pave the way for critical sciences. Quite to the contrary, the predominant 
neoliberalist free market ideology represents a hindrance for funding critical research. 
Moreover, during the past decades the hegemony in Norwegian psychology has shifted 
markedly away from a social, towards a more genetic-biological, neurological and cognitive 
science of psychology. This shift of ideological hegemony has also contributed to less focus 
on critical psychology’s core issues of interest. 
 
                                                            
10 This situation is very different from the situation (social) psychology faces in Latin America: Montero & 
Christlieb (2003) maintain that “… there is also a Latin American Social Psychology, which, … is a 
social-political-community psychology of liberation, born out of the critical standing assumed by many Latin 
American psychologists facing the social-political-economic conditions suffered by as much as sixty or eighty 
percent of the population. So when speaking of Latin American Social Psychology, it is almost redundant to say 
that it is critical psychology. If it really is Latin American, it cannot be otherwise …” (p. 8, italics added). 
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Moreover, in our 2006 ARCP review of critical psychology in Norway we concluded that 
critical psychology was currently virtually absent within Norwegian psychology. This 
situation is not representative for Norwegian psychology historically (Blakar & Nafstad, 
2006; Nafstad & Blakar, 1982). In the decades following WWII, psychology in general and 
social psychology in particular were established in Norway as critical disciplines aiming at 
resolving societal problems. Resolution of huge societal problems in the post WWII 
Norwegian society set the agenda for the concrete research. Another critical phase took place 
in the 1970’s when psychology, as the other social sciences, was radicalized due to the 
international ideological movements associated with 1968 and the students’ revolts. Whereas 
the critical attitude of the postwar period expressed a deeply felt need to develop a 
psychology enabling change and creation of a better society and in particular avoid new wars, 
it may be reason to ask if the critical attitude of the seventies more reflected a kind of 
superficial lip service to specific political ideologies. Partly as a reaction to the politicized 
seventies, psychology in Norway from the 1980’s on has been striving towards the ideals of 
hard, ‘neutral’11 science, thus obscuring the basic fact that individual and society are “two 
sides of the same coin” thereby leaving no or little space for critical psychology.  
 
Thus, it would have been naïve to expect radical changes in the vitality of critical psychology 
in Norway during the few years since our last review appeared. Even though a few new 
critical voices have been added to those described in our 2006 review, we have to wait a few 
years before it will be meaningful to prepare a complete update. However, one person, Ole 
Jacob Madsen, deserves particular mention for his efforts to promote critical psychology in 
Norway; in the public discourse as well as among colleagues. Currently he is editing a special 
issue on critical psychology in the Journal of the Norwegian Psychological Association. In his 
recent book, Den terapeutiske kultur (The therapeutic culture), Madsen (2010) has critically 
examined various consequences of the “success story” of psychology in our modern era. 
Moreover, he has become a very active participant in the public discourse posing critical 
questions about psychology’s different roles in society. Madsen is also represented with an 
article on the therapeutic culture in Norway in this issue of ARCP. Moreover, critical gender 
research described in our 2006 review is still flourishing in Norway. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that critical psychology is gradually being taught at Norwegian universities. For 
example, at the University of Oslo the present authors give a course which is mandatory for 
all students who are going to be licenced as clinical psychologists in which different 
perspectives and horizons in psychology – including critical ones – are presented and 
discussed.  
 
Carlquist et al. (2007, p. 295) expose the current challenges of critical psychology in Norway 
when they in their review of community psychology in Norway conclude that: “… 
community psychology in Norway must aspire toward a more prominent and critical 
discipline within Norwegian psychology in the years to come; explicitly focusing on and 
arguing for alternative values based on solidarity and social equality.” (Italics added.) This is 
vital as the Norwegian society, traditionally a Scandinavian welfare state, increasingly 
prioritize neoliberalism with its strong individualistic ideology with the consequence of 
erosion of ideals of social responsibility and willingness to stand up for the core values of 
welfare societies: solidarity and social and economic equality. 
 
                                                            
11 From the perspective of critical psychology, all psychology, not only critical psychology, is value laden. Thus 
it represents an ethical imperative for every psychology to explicate its value basis and tacit assumptions 
(Nafstad, 2005, 2006, 2008).  
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